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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The United States filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Union alleging Clean Water
Act (CWA) violations on behalf of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against Moon Moo
Farm. Deep Quod Riverwatcher, an environmental organization,
and its member Dean James (collectively “Riverwatcher”)
intervened. Riverwatcher asserted both an additional CWA claim
and two claims under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA). Moon Moo crossclaimed for common law trespass
based on Riverwatcher’s conduct before suit. On April 21, 2014,
the district court granted Moon Moo’s motion for summary
judgment dismissing the CWA and RCRA claims and ruling in its
favor on the trespass claim. The district court’s order is final, and
jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Whether Moon Moo Farm requires a permit under the
Clean Water Act NPDES permitting program because it is a point
source under the statute.
II. Whether Moon Moo Farm can be subject to a citizen
suit under RCRA because its application of manure and whey to
its fields qualifies as solid waste disposal and, if so, whether that
conduct creates an imminent and substantial threat of harm to
human health.
III. Whether the Queechunk Canal, a man-made water
body, is a public trust navigable water of the State of New Union
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allowing for a public right of navigation despite private
ownership of the banks on both side and the bottom of the canal
by Moon Moo Farm.
IV. If the canal is not a public trust navigable water,
whether evidence obtained through trespass and without a
warrant is admissible in a civil enforcement proceeding brought
under CWA §§ 309(b), (d) and 505.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the District Court for the District of
New Union’s grant of summary judgment against EPA and
Riverwatcher. (R. 4). In its complaint, EPA asserted that Moon
Moo Farm violated the CWA’s permitting provisions—33 U.S.C. §
1311(a), 1319(b), 1319(d) and 1342. (R. 4). EPA alleged that Moon
Moo was subject to NPDES permitting due to discharges
resulting from Moon Moo’s application of manure and whey to its
field. (R. 7–8). Riverwatcher intervened, asserting both CWA and
RCRA claims. (R. 4). Riverwatcher claimed that Moon Moo’s
conduct both qualified as open dumping under RCRA and created
an “imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or
the environment.” (R. 10) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)
(2012)). Moon Moo crossclaimed against Riverwatcher, asserting
Dean James trespassed on private property to obtain evidence.
Moon Moo sought both damages and injunctive relief. (R. 7).
All three parties sought summary judgment on the
environmental claims after discovery, and Moon Moo sought
summary judgment on its trespass claim. Id. The district court
granted Moon Moo’s motions and denied plaintiffs’ motions. (R.
12). It held that Moon Moo was not a CAFO because James
obtained evidence related to that issue through trespass; the
evidence was therefore not admissible. (R. XX). The court
awarded Moon Moo $ 832,560 in damages. (R. XX). Next, it
concluded that land application of manure and whey is not solid
waste disposal, defeating both RCRA claims. (R. 10). Even if the
amendments were solid waste, the court held that Riverwatcher
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produced insufficient evidence to establish imminent and
substantial endangerment. (R. 11).
The United States (on behalf of EPA), Deep Quod
Riverwatcher, and Dean James all filed Notices of Appeal
challenging all three aspects of the court’s decision. (R. 1).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Moon Moo Farm is a dairy farm with 350 head of cows in the
State of New Union. (R. 4). It houses the cows in a barn and
collects and stores their manure and liquid waste in an outdoor
lagoon for use as fertilizer. (R. 4–5). Moon Moo designed its
lagoon to withstand a 25-year rainfall event. (R. 5). Moon Moo
spreads the manure over 150 acres of fields that grow Bermuda
grass, which it uses for silage. Id. In 2010, Moon Moo increased
its herd from 170 to the current 350 cows in an effort to meet
increased demand for milk from the nearby Chokos Greek Yogurt
processing facility. Id. For the past two years, Chokos has given
Moon Moo acid whey produced by the plant, which Moon Moo
adds to its lagoons and includes in the mixture sprayed on its
fields. Id.
Moon Moo farm is located at a bend in the Deep Quod River.
Id. To alleviate flooding, a previous farm owner constructed a
bypass canal through the middle of the farm, known as the
Queechunk Canal. Id. The canal, owned on both sides by Moon
Moo and prominently posted with “No Trespassing” signs, is fifty
yards wide, three to four feet deep, and can be navigated by a
canoe or other small boat. Id. Despite the signs, the canal is
commonly used as a shortcut up and down the Deep Quod, which
flows year round, can be navigated by small boat, and runs into
the Mississippi River. Id. The river also serves as a drinking
water source for the downstream community of Farmville. Id.
New Union regulates Moon Moo as a “no-discharge” animal
feeding operation. (R. 6). Because of this designation, Moon Moo
must submit a Nutrient Management Plan (NMP) to the
Farmville Regional Office of the State of New Union Department
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of Agriculture (DOA). (R. 5). The NMP regulates manure
application rates based on a calculation of expected nutrient
uptake by Moon Moo’s crops. Id. Although New Union has
authorization to issue CWA permits, Moon Moo does not hold a
permit issued pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES). (R. 5–6).
In early 2013, Deep Quod Riverwatcher, a nonprofit
organization, received complaints that the river smelled of
manure and was an unusual brown color. (R. 6). Around this
time, the Farmville Water Authority (FWA) issued a nitrate
advisory for its drinking water customers citing high levels of
nitrates and fecal coliforms. Id. The advisory suggested that
customers use bottled water for infant consumption, but also
informed them that the water posed no risk to adults. Id.
In response to the complaints, Dean James investigated the
river in a small outboard watercraft on April 12, 2013. Id.
Between April 11 and 12, two inches of rain fell in the region, a
significant storm event, but one far short of the five inches of rain
in 24 hours needed to constitute a 25-year event. Id. James
ignored the “No Trespassing” signs and entered the Queechunk
Canal, where he photographed manure-spreading operations on
Moon Moo’s property and discolored brown water flowing from
the fields into a drainage ditch. Id. James took samples of the
ditch water as it entered the canal. Id. James later had the
samples tested by a water-testing laboratory; tests showed
elevated levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms. Id.
Moon Moo applies manure and whey to its fields in
accordance with its NMP. Id. Riverwatcher submitted expert
testimony to suggest that a low pH of 6.1 caused by the addition
of acid whey to the manure mixture prevented the Bermuda grass
from absorbing nutrients effectively, causing excess nutrients to
be released into the Queechunk Canal. Id. Riverwatcher’s expert
also stated that spreading manure during a rain event would
nearly always result in excess runoff. Moon Moo’s NMP does not
forbid such a practice. (R. 6, 7). Further, application of whey as a
soil conditioner has been a traditional practice in New Union for
decades. (R. 6).
It is also true that, because the Deep Quod River watershed
is heavily farmed, nitrate advisories have been issued five times
since 2002. (R. 7). These advisories predate Moon Moo’s increase
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in operations and use of whey on its farm. Id. Another expert
testifying on Riverwatcher’s behalf stated that it was impossible
to say for sure that runoff from Moon Moo Farm was the “but for”
cause of the 2013 nitrate advisory. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court granted Moon Moo’s motion for summary
judgment. This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, “viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Roberts v. Printup, 422 F.3d
1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2005).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Moon Moo Farm is not subject to NPDES permitting because
it does not discharge pollutants into navigable waters of the
United States via a point source. Moon Moo does not qualify as a
point source because its discharges are agricultural stormwater
runoff, which the CWA explicitly excludes from the definition of a
point source.
The district court also correctly concluded that Moon Moo did
not violate RCRA. RCRA’s plain text decries Riverwatcher’s
assertion that application of soil amendments constitutes solid
waste disposal. Congress did not intend to regulate the use of soil
amendments under RCRA. Case law supports Moon Moo’s belief
that, by enhancing its farm’s productive use, it was not engaging
in waste disposal. Even if the soil amendments qualify as solid
waste, Riverwatcher failed to produce sufficient evidence to tie
recent nitrate advisories in Farmville to Moon Moo’s conduct.
The Queechunk Canal is not a public trust navigable water
because it is not navigable in its natural state and has no public
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right of access. Consequently, the district court properly excluded
evidence obtained through trespass. James’s water sample is also
inadmissible because it broke the evidentiary chain of custody.

ARGUMENT

I.

MOON MOO FARM DOES NOT REQUIRE A
PERMIT UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
NPDES PERMITTING PROGRAM BECAUSE IT IS
NOT A POINT SOURCE OF POLLUTION UNDER
THE STATUTE.

The Clean Water Act (CWA) generally prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters of the United
States. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012). However, the CWA allows for
pollution from a point source when the pollution activity complies
with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit program. Id. § 1342.
The CWA defines a “pollutant” to include “industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” Id. §
1362(6). The CWA defines a “point source” as:
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged . . .

Id. § 1362(14). The definition also states that a point source “does
not include agricultural stormwater discharges.” Id. The CWA
does not define the terms “concentrated animal feeding operation”
or “agricultural stormwater discharge.” See id. § 1362.
Moon Moo Farm does not require a NPDES permit because
it does not discharge pollutants into navigable waters of the
United States via a point source. Instead, Moon Moo’s discharges
are agricultural stormwater runoff, which the CWA explicitly
excludes from the definition of a point source. Id. § 1362(14).

7
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A. Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, which means it is
not subject to NPDES permitting by virtue of a
discharge from a CAFO manure land application
area.
EPA’s CAFO rule addresses pollution discharges resulting
from land application activities by CAFOs. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e)
(2014). The rule states the following:
[t]he discharge of manure . . . to waters of the United States
from a CAFO as a result of the application of that manure . . .
by the CAFO to land areas under its control is a discharge
from that CAFO subject to NPDES permit requirements,
except where it is an agricultural stormwater discharge as
provided by 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).

Id. The rule then states that when discharges from CAFO land
applications are conducted in accordance with specified nutrient
management practices, the discharges are considered agricultural
stormwater (thereby being exempt from NPDES permitting). Id.
According to section 122.23(b)(2), a CAFO is a particular type
of animal feeding operation (AFO). Id. § 122.23(b)(2). An AFO is
considered a CAFO when it either satisfies the criteria of a
Medium or Large CAFO or when it is designated as a CAFO
through a process provided by the regulation. Id. The criteria for
a Large CAFO are based strictly on the number of animals. Id. §
122.23(b)(4). Moon Moo Farm is not a Large CAFO because its
350 cow dairy herd is far below the minimum 700 mature dairy
cows or 1,000 other cattle required. Also, Moon Moo is not a
designated CAFO because the farm has not been designated as a
CAFO through the process outlined in section 122.23(c).
The criteria for a Medium CAFO are based both on the
number of animals and one of the following conditions:
Pollutants are discharged into waters of the United States
through a man-made ditch, flushing system, or other similar
man-made device; or
Pollutants are discharged directly into waters of the United
States which originate outside of and pass over, across, or
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through the facility or otherwise come into direct contact with
the animals confined in the operation.

Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii).
Moon Moo is not a Medium CAFO because it does not satisfy
either of the two pollution conditions.1 Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii). The
second condition is not satisfied because there is no claim that
“waters of the United States which originate outside of and pass
over, across, or through the facility or otherwise come into direct
contact” with Moon Moo’s animals. Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii)(B).
The first condition requires that the AFO discharge
pollutants into waters of the United States through a man-made
ditch, flushing system, or other similar man-made device. This
condition is not satisfied because the only man-made ditch
identified is located exclusively on land outside the boundaries of
Moon Moo’s AFO. According to 40 CFR 122.23, an AFO is:
a lot or facility . . . where the following conditions are met: (i)
Animals . . . have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and
fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12–
month period, and (ii) Crops, vegetation, forage growth, or
post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing
season over any portion of the lot or facility.

Id. § 122.23(b)(1). Based on the plain meaning of the AFO
definition, Moon Moo Farm contains an AFO (its dairy operation)
as well as a 150-acre field of Bermuda grass that is not an AFO.
(R. 5). The field does not meet the definition of an AFO because
(1) animals are not stabled or confined on the field, and (2) crops
and vegetation, specifically Bermuda grass, are sustained
throughout the field during the normal growing season. See id.
Because the only alleged ditch is located exclusively within the
1.In addition, the record is inconclusive as to whether Moon Moo’s herd contains
the requisite number of animals to qualify as a Medium CAFO. Moon Moo Farm
currently has a 350 cow milking herd. (R. 5). A herd of milking cows consists of
calves, immature females (heifers), and mature dairy cows. Ag 101—Lifecycle
Production
Phases,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/ag101/dairyphases.html. The record does not
indicate the specific composition of the herd, which means it has not been
established that Moon Moo’s milking herd consists of either the 200–699 mature
dairy cows or 300–999 other cattle required for Moon Moo to be a Medium
CAFO. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(6)(i)(A); Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(i)(C).
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field, (R. 6), there is no evidence that the AFO itself has
discharged pollutants through a man-made ditch, flushing
system, or other similar man-made device as required by section
122.23(b)(6)(ii)(A).
The situation would be different if the AFO independently
qualified as a CAFO because a CAFO is a point source, and it is
well established that land appurtenant to a point source facility is
part of the point source facility. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; Alt v. EPA,
979 F. Supp. 2d 701, 713 (N.D. W. Va. 2013). But unlike a CAFO,
an AFO is not listed as a point source in the CWA and therefore
is not a point source unless it has a “discernible, confined, and
discrete conveyance.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). The ditch wholly
within the field adjacent to the AFO cannot make Moon Moo’s
AFO a point source because land appurtenant to the AFO is not
part of the AFO facility until the AFO independently qualifies as
a point source. This means that for the dairy operation to meet
the first pollution condition, the operation itself would need to
discharge pollutants through a ditch. Because there is no
evidence of a ditch from the production area, the dairy operation
cannot be deemed a Medium CAFO because it does not satisfy
either of the two conditions in section 122.23(b)(6)(ii).2
It might be argued that according to Waterkeeper, the
discharges located in the field adjacent to the AFO are actually
discharges from the AFO itself. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA,
399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005). Waterkeeper involved a challenge to
EPA’s CAFO rule, focusing in part on the rule’s land application
provisions (section 122.23(e)).3 Id. at 506-11. Industry groups
argued that the land application provisions in effect regulated
“uncollected” discharges because the provisions would apply
regardless of whether the discharges were ultimately channeled
2. The “production area” is defined by section 122.23(b)(8) to include the
animal confinement area, the manure storage area, the raw materials storage
area, and the waste containment areas, each of which are defined by
122.23(b)(8).
3. The CAFO rule has been revised three times since the 2003 version
challenged in Waterkeeper, but the land application provisions in 122.23 (e) that
the court analyzed in Waterkeeper have remained the same. Compare 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.23(e) (2003), and id. § 122.23(e) (2006), and id. § 122.23(e) (2007), and id.
§ 122.23(e) (2008), with id. § 122.23(e) (2014). The part of 122.23(e) that has
changed since 2003 is the addition of 122.23(e)(i) and 122.23(ii). Compare id. §
122.23(e) (2003), with id. § 122.23(e) (2014).
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through a discrete conveyance. See id. at 510. According to the
industry groups, regulation of these “uncollected” discharges
would mean EPA was regulating a non-point source under
NPDES, which is unauthorized under the CWA. See id. The
Second Circuit rejected that argument, concluding, “regardless of
whether or not runoff is collected at the land application area . . .
any discharge from a land area under the control of a CAFO is a
point source discharge subject to regulation because it is a
discharge from a CAFO.” Id. The court explained that because the
CAFO is both a point source and the “proximate cause” of the
discharge, any discharge from the land application area can be
classified as “a discharge from the CAFO that can be regulated as
a point source discharge.” Id; see also Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration
of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir.
2002) (applying similar reasoning to a similar scenario).
Waterkeeper is inapplicable to the question of whether Moon
Moo’s AFO is a Medium CAFO by virtue of its land applications.
In Waterkeeper, the court assumed that the animal production
operations were CAFOs before considering whether uncollected
discharges from those operations’ land application activities could
be regulated. See id. at 506-11. The court reached its conclusion
on the uncollected discharge question by (1) observing that
CAFOs themselves are point sources, and (2) reasoning that
discharges from a CAFO’s land application activities are
essentially discharges from the CAFO itself. See id. at 510-11.
Therefore, Waterkeeper cannot be used to determine whether the
discharges located in the field adjacent to the AFO are discharges
from the AFO itself without first answering the prerequisite
question of whether Moon Moo operates a CAFO.
In summary, Moon Moo is not a Large CAFO because it does
not contain the minimum number of animals required by section
122.23(b)(4). Moon Moo is not a designated CAFO because there
is no evidence that it has been designated through the process
outlined in section 122.23(c). Lastly, Moon Moo is not a Medium
CAFO because any discharge of pollutants through a man-made
ditch occurs on land that does not comprise an AFO. Because
section 122.23 only applies to CAFOs and Moon Moo Farm is not
a CAFO, Moon Moo is not subject to NPDES permitting for
discharges from a CAFO manure land application area under
section 122.23(e).

11
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B. Moon Moo Farm’s land application discharges are
exempt from NPDES permitting as agricultural
stormwater discharges.
1.

As a Non-CAFO, Moon Moo’s nutrient
discharges from its manure application fields
are agricultural stormwater discharges that
are not subject to NPDES permitting.

The CWA states that agricultural stormwater discharges are
not a point source of pollution, which means they are not subject
to NPDES permitting. 33 U.S.C. § 1342, § 1362(14) (2012). But
neither the CWA nor EPA regulations provide a general
definition of an agricultural stormwater discharge.4 This has led
to confusion in the context of AFOs because discharges resulting
from AFO activities can share characteristics of both a point
source discharge (subject to NPDES permitting) and an
agricultural stormwater discharge (not subject to NPDES
permitting). EPA has clarified the boundaries between a point
source discharge and a stormwater runoff discharge when a
CAFO facility applies waste to land under its control. See 40
C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2014). But EPA has not issued regulations
that clarify the boundaries between point sources and
agricultural stormwater in other contexts, such as for AFOs that
do not qualify as CAFOs. In contexts other than land application
activities from CAFOs, courts must interpret the plain meaning
of agricultural stormwater runoff based on its “ordinary meaning
in accordance with common usage.” Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d
701, 710-11 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (citing BP v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84,
91, 127 (2006)).
The plain meaning of agricultural stormwater was analyzed
in Southview Farm. Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v.
Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994). In Southview Farm,
the Second Circuit assessed whether a reasonable jury could have
4. At most, EPA provides some examples of agricultural stormwater
discharges in section 122.3(e) by saying that NPDES permits are not required
for “any introduction of pollutants from non point-source agricultural and
silvicultural activities, including storm water runoff from orchards, cultivated
crops, pastures, range lands, and forest lands, but not discharges from
concentrated animal feeding operations as defined in § 122.23….” 40 C.F.R. §
122.3(e) (2014).
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found that discharges from a CAFO’s land application activities
were exempted as agricultural stormwater.5 Id. The court framed
the issue as “not whether the discharges occurred during rainfall
or were mixed with rain water run-off, but rather, whether the
discharges were the result of precipitation [in which case they
would be considered agricultural stormwater].” Id. at 120-21; see
also Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (citing Southview Farm when
finding that a CAFO’s non-land application discharge was
exempted as agricultural stormwater because it resulted from
precipitation). The court held that a reasonable jury could find
that the CAFO discharges “were not the result of rain, but rather
simply occurred on days when it rained,” meaning the discharges
fell outside of the agricultural exemption. See Southview Farm,
34 F.3d at 121. In reaching its decision, the court cited testimony
from numerous eyewitnesses. One witness stated that after the
farm spread manure, the manure “had pooled in the corner of
their field right next to our property . . . larger than I had seen
before, and it had been pooled there, and then it rained . . . [t]hen
it drizzled into the ditch and through the drainage pipe.” Id.
Another witness stated that “a lot of manure [was] coming off the
field through the areas where the banks had fallen away.” Id.
Based on the ordinary meaning of the term agricultural
stormwater runoff, as properly discerned by the Second Circuit in
Southview Farm, Moon Moo’s discharges are agricultural
stormwater runoff because they resulted from precipitation
events. In Southview Farm, the key testimony that permitted the
Second Circuit to let the verdict against the CAFO stand stated
that the manure itself was being directly discharged into waters
of the United States. Witnesses saw pools of liquid manure
standing in the field before it rained, and then after it rained said
that “a lot of manure [was] coming off the field” in places where
the banks had fallen away. Id. In other words, the discharges
were found not to be “result of precipitation,” but rather direct
discharges of manure that occurred contemporaneously to a rain
event. This direct discharge presumably resulted from soil erosion
that created a conduit for the standing liquid manure to enter the

5. This was before EPA promulgated 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e), which clarified
when a CAFO’s land application discharges are considered agricultural
stormwater runoff.

13
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nearby waters, as supported by the witness testimony of the
manure “coming off the field through the areas where the banks
had fallen away.” Id.
In contrast, there is no evidence of direct manure discharges
here. James states that he observed and photographed “manure
spreading operations taking place” during a rain event. (R. 6). He
also observed and photographed “discolored brown water flowing
from the fields,” which laboratory tests found to have elevated
levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms. Id. But James simply
describes a paradigm example of agricultural stormwater runoff
resulting from precipitation. Brown colored water is exactly what
one would expect to be draining from a dirt field after a rain
event. James’s observation that manure spreading operations
were occurring on the same day as the brown discharges might
help to identify the source of the pollution in the stormwater
runoff (manure spreading operations). But unlike the witnesses
in Southview Farm, James never stated that he actually saw
manure collecting on the field or directly discharging into the
river. Absent any evidence to the contrary, common sense dictates
that the precipitation event between April 11 and 12 caused
nutrients from Moon Moo’s land application activities to be
discharged into the canal. Therefore, based on the ordinary
meaning of agricultural stormwater discharge, the discharges
from Moon Moo Farm are exempt from NPDES permitting.
2.

Even if Moon Moo were assumed to be a CAFO,
nutrient discharges from its manure
application fields would be agricultural
stormwater discharges exempt from NPDES
permitting.

As stated above, section 122.23(e) of the CAFO rule states
that discharges resulting from land application activities by a
CAFO to land under its control are subject to NPDES permitting
requirements unless they qualify as agricultural stormwater
discharges. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2014). Section 122.23(e) then
states:
where the manure . . . has been applied in accordance with
site specific nutrient management practices that ensure
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appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the
manure . . . as specified in § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix), a
precipitation-related discharge of manure . . . from land
areas under the control of a CAFO is an agricultural
stormwater discharge.

Id. It might appear on first glance that CAFO land application
activities can only qualify as agricultural stormwater discharges
if they meet the criteria described in section 122.23(e). However,
a further reading reveals otherwise. Immediately following the
text quoted above, 122.23(e)(1) states:
[f]or unpermitted Large CAFOs, a precipitation-related
discharge of manure . . . from land areas under the control
of a CAFO shall be considered an agricultural stormwater
discharge only where [it] . . . has been land applied in
accordance with site-specific nutrient management
practices that ensure appropriate agricultural utilization
of the nutrients in the manure . . . as specified in §
122.42(e)(1)(vi) through (ix).6

Id. § 122.23(e)(1) (emphasis added).
Section 122.23(e)(1) makes it clear that for Large CAFOs,
there is only one way that land application discharges can be
considered agricultural stormwater discharges: when the CAFO
conducts land application activities “in accordance with site
specific nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate
agricultural utilization of the nutrients. . .as specified in §
122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix).” Id. But for Medium CAFOs, there is no
parallel to section 122.23(e)(1); there is only the main text of
section 122.23(e). When the main text of 122.23(e) is read
alongside of 122.23(e)(1), the inescapable conclusion is that for
Medium CAFOs, land application activities conducted in
accordance with site specific nutrient management practices
6. “Unpermitted” means the CAFO is not subject to NPDES permitting by
virtue of discharges outside of those exempt as agricultural stormwater. If a
CAFO is subject to NPDES permitting (either due to non-land application
discharges or land application discharges that don’t qualify for the agricultural
stormwater exemption), then it must submit an NMP satisfying additional
criteria beyond what is provided by § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix), and the NMP would
be subject to the public comment process. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.42(e) (2014); id. §
124.10.
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conforming to § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix) will guarantee that the
discharges are considered agricultural stormwater, but it is not
the exclusive way for discharges to be considered agricultural
stormwater.
If Moon Moo Farm was found to be a CAFO, it could only be a
Medium CAFO because its 350 cow dairy herd is far below the
minimum 700 mature dairy cows or 1,000 other cattle required to
be a Large CAFO. See id. § 122.23(b)(4). Therefore, Moon Moo
would not be required to show that its land application activities
are conducted in accordance with site specific nutrient
management practices that conform to § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix). Id. §
122.23(e).
Other than the guarantee provided when a CAFO ensures
“appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients,” section
122.23(e) does not indicate when discharges from Medium CAFO
land application activities qualify as agricultural stormwater
runoff. Furthermore, the CWA does not define agricultural
stormwater runoff. When statutes and regulations are silent as to
the meaning of a term, courts must give the term its “ordinary
meaning in accordance with common usage.” Alt v. EPA, 979 F.
Supp. 2d 701, 710-11 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (citing BP v. Burton, 549
U.S. 84, 91, 127 (2006)).
Assuming that Moon Moo was a Medium CAFO, the analysis
for whether its land application discharges would be exempt as
agricultural stormwater runoff is the same as the non-CAFO
plain meaning analysis conducted in section I.B.1 above. Based
on the ordinary meaning of agricultural stormwater discharge
and the analysis conducted above, the discharges from Moon Moo
Farm would be exempt from NPDES permitting.
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Neither the levels of nitrates and fecal
coliforms nor the discharge of the stormwater
through a drainage ditch change the
conclusion that Moon Moo’s nutrient
discharges are agricultural stormwater
discharges not subject to NPDES permitting.

Riverwatcher claims that the samples they took from Moon
Moo’s ditch had highly elevated levels of nitrates and fecal
coliforms. (R. 6). Dr. Mae asserts that the manure’s acidity
discouraged nutrient absorption and that “land application of
manure during a rain event is a very poor management practice”
that will almost always result in “excess runoff of nutrients from
fields.” Id. Riverwatcher’s reliance on these facts is misplaced.
The purpose of the agricultural stormwater exemption is to
exclude certain sources of pollution from NPDES permitting
coverage. This means pollution (whether from excess runoff of
nutrients or other sources) is expected in any exempt discharge,
otherwise there would be no need to invoke the exemption.
There is no basis for taking the magnitude of Moon Moo’s
discharge into account for situations outside of a Large CAFO
covered by section 122.23(e)(1). 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (e)(1) (2014).
Whether a discharge falls within the ordinary meaning of
agricultural stormwater depends on whether it results from
precipitation, not on its magnitude. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at
121.
Lastly, the existence of a ditch as the mechanism for
transferring Moon Moo’s agricultural stormwater discharges into
waters of the United States has no bearing on the discharges’
status as agricultural stormwater discharges. Agricultural
stormwater discharges are those resulting from precipitation, and
they are still exempt “even when those discharges came from
what would otherwise be point sources.” Waterkeeper Alliance,
Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 507 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Concerned
Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
1994); Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. W. Va. 2013)
(illustrating that discharges from CAFOs, which are statutorily
defined as point sources, are considered agricultural stormwater
runoff when they result from precipitation). Because the
discharges here result from precipitation and are therefore
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exempt stormwater discharges, it is irrelevant that a ditch is the
mechanism for transferring Moon Moo’s discharges into waters of
the United States.
4.

Moon Moo’s application of manure in
accordance with its nutrient management plan
(NMP) provides additional support that its
discharges are exempt as agricultural
stormwater.

New Union regulates Moon Moo Farm as a “no-discharge”
AFO. (R. 5). Being a “no-discharge” operation means Moon Moo
should not normally have direct manure discharges. Id. Per its
regulatory requirements, Moon Moo submitted a nutrient
management plan (NMP) to the New Union Department of
Agriculture (DOA). Id. The NMP provided planned seasonal
manure application rates and a calculation of expected uptake of
nutrients by the crops grown on the fields where the manure was
spread. Id. Moon Moo’s manure land applications have been
conducted in accordance with its NMP at all times relevant to
this case. (R. 6).
As explained above in sections I.A and I.B.2, Moon Moo need
not submit an NMP for its land application discharges to be
classified as agricultural stormwater under 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e)
because (1) it is not a CAFO, and (2) even if it were a CAFO, it
would be an unpermitted Medium CAFO, and only unpermitted
Large CAFOs are limited to an NMP as the exclusive option for
receiving the agricultural stormwater exemption. Instead, Moon
Moo’s discharges are exempt if they fall within the plain meaning
of an agricultural stormwater discharge (which they do).
But the New Union DOA’s acceptance of Moon Moo’s NMP
does provide additional support that Moon Moo’s land
applications are agricultural stormwater discharges. This is
because Moon Moo submitted its NMP as a no-discharge
operation under New Union’s regulatory scheme, which means
land applications in accordance with the NMP should not result
in direct manure discharges. If Moon Moo’s land applications do
not result in direct manure discharges, then their discharges with
excess nutrients must be the result of precipitation and fall
within the plain meaning of agricultural stormwater discharges.
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Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 121 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701,
711 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (interpreting the plain meaning of
stormwater discharges to be “precipitation-related discharges”).
Therefore, New Union’s acceptance of Moon Moo’s NMP supports
the district court’s conclusion that Moon Moo’s discharges result
from precipitation and are exempt from NPDES permitting as
agricultural stormwater discharges.
II. MOON MOO FARM’S APPLICATION OF SOIL
AMENDMENTS DOES NOT VIOLATE RCRA
BECAUSE THE MANURE AND WHEY NEITHER
CONSTITUTE SOLID WASTE NOR REPRESENT
AN IMMINENT AND SUBSTANTIAL
ENDANGERMENT TO HUMAN HEALTH OR THE
ENVRIONMENT
Congress drafted the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) in 1976 to deal with escalating waste disposal
problems throughout the United States. Congress also expressly
noted its desire to create “a national system to insure the safe
management of hazardous waste.” American Mining Congress v.
EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (herein AMC I) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 3 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.,
1976). Congress intended RCRA to apply to both hazardous and
non-hazardous solid wastes; RCRA does not, however, apply to
every potential environmental harm. RCRA entered a regulatory
universe already populated by the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §
1251 et seq., 1972) and Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.,
1970). RCRA Subtitle D, which deals with nonhazardous solid
waste disposal, defines solid waste as:
garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial,
commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from
community activities. . .
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42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2012) (emphasis added).7 Riverwatcher
asserts that Moon Moo violated several open dumping provisions
and created an “imminent and substantial endangerment to
human health.” (R. 10). Both claims first require Riverwatcher to
establish that the material at issue qualifies as solid waste,
specifically as “other discarded material” from “agricultural
operations.” Id.
Since Moon Moo’s land application of whey and manure does
not qualify as solid waste disposal, the district court properly
dismissed both claims. Even if Moon Moo disposed of solid waste,
Riverwatcher failed to connect Moon Moo’s practices to any
“imminent and substantial endangerment.” 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(B) (2012).
A. Moon Moo Farm’s soil amendments do not qualify
as discarded material.8
RCRA’s definition of solid waste includes both specific
categories (e.g., “garbage, refuse,” and “sludge”) and more general
descriptions (e.g., “other discarded material”) 42 U.S.C. §
6903(27) (2012). While it might appear that the inclusion of
“other discarded material” makes the definition broad in scope,
Congress in fact defined solid waste narrowly. Based on the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, a general category that appears
immediately following an enumerated list should apply only to
“things of the same general class as those enumerated.” AMC I,
824 F.2d at 1189. Riverwatcher asserts that the manure and
whey constitute other discarded material. (R. 11). To determine
whether a material has been discarded, courts consider the
statute’s plain text, legislative history, and the operator’s
purpose. See Safe Air v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004).
In Safe Air v. Meyer, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether
blue grass residue left on a field and then burned after the
harvest qualified as a solid waste. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1037. This
practice is known as “open field burning.” Id. The remaining ash
restored necessary nutrients to the soil, fertilized future crops,
7. Riverwatcher does not allege that Moon Moo has disposed of hazardous
waste, governed by RCRA Subtitle C. (R. 10).
8. If Moon Moo qualifies as a point source under the CWA, RCRA expressly
excludes it from regulation under Subtitle D. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
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and reduced the need for artificial pesticides by deterring insects.
Id. at 1044. Open field burning enabled productive use of the
fields for a much longer period of time. Id. As described below, the
Meyer court’s approach demonstrates analysis of the term
“discarded material” consistent with the statutory text, Congress’
intent, and consideration of operator purpose.
1.

The plain meaning of “other discarded
materials” does not encompass manure and
whey applied to the land for a beneficial
purpose.

Under traditional cannons of statutory construction, courts
should first look to the statutory language selected by Congress.
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 377 (1981). The statute’s meaning
relies foremost on the common meaning of its words; “unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Meyer, 373 F.3d at
1041 (internal citation omitted). This begins with the
understanding that “the legislative purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used.” Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 149 (1984). Since Congress did not
define “other discarded material,” courts should look to the plain
meaning and dictionary definition of “discarded.” Meyer, 373 F.3d
at 1041. Discarded imparts an understanding that the material
has been “disposed of, thrown away or abandoned.” AMC I, 824
F.2d at 1183 (internal citation omitted).
The common meaning of discarded comports with the waste
disposal problems that inspired Congress to enact RCRA. The
AMC I court looked both to plain meaning and Congress’s intent
to determine that material has not been discarded when intended
for “immediate reuse.” Id. at 1184-85. The D.C. Circuit
summarized Congress’s intent as “extend[ing] EPA’s authority
only to materials that are truly discarded, disposed of, thrown
away, or abandoned.” Id. at 1190. Materials “destined for
beneficial reuse” play no role in the waste disposal problem that
inspired RCRA. Id. at 1186. This framework does not encompass
beneficial use of manure and whey. Common sense dictates that
the use of soil amendments to increase crop yields does not
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equate to waste disposal under the common meaning of the term
“discarded.”
2.

Congress intended RCRA to apply primarily to
truly discarded material, especially waste in
landfills.

Especially in context of contemporaneous environmental
regulation, Congress sought to “eliminate[ ] the last remaining
loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal
of discarded materials and hazardous wastes.” H.R. REP. NO. 941491, at 4 (1976). Since RCRA’s initial enactment:
neither Congress, nor EPA’s implementing regulations, ever
contemplated that application of manure and other solid
amendments to agricultural fields would be considered a solid
waste disposal practice subject to regulation under RCRA.

(R. 10). When promulgating RCRA, Congress referred to the
“‘rising tide’ in scrap, discarded, and waste materials” as well as
the need “to provide for proper and economical solid waste
disposal practices.” AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1179 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
6901(a)(2) and (a)(4)). Reuse of animal manure and whey as soil
amendments does not implicate the concerns that motivated
Congress to enact RCRA.
An accompanying House Report describes RCRA as “a multifaceted approach toward solving the problems associated with the
3-4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year.” H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1491, at 2 (1976). Congress sought to spur “[a]n
increase in reclamation and reuse practices.” Id. at 3. Application
of soil amendments represents the very type of recycling practice
that Congress sought to encourage. The same report indicates
that “[a]gricultural wastes which are returned to the soil as
fertilizers . . . are not considered discarded materials in the sense
of this legislation.” Id. Moon Moo’s conduct already qualifies as
the type of reuse and reclamation practice Congress sought to
encourage by promulgating RCRA.
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Moon Moo’s purpose in applying whey and
manure to the fields pursuant to a valid
Nutrient Management Plan indicates that the
soil amendments are not discarded.

Finally, courts consider “whether the party intended to throw
the material away or put it to a beneficial use.” Safe Food &
Fertilizer v. EPA, 350 F.3d 1263, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This
process has been described as “a functional inquiry,” focused on
“defendants’ use of the animal waste products rather than the
agriculture waste definition.” Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21314, at *12
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2001). The same is true even if the material is
destined for reuse in a different industry. Safe Food, 350 F.3d at
1268. The fact that Moon Moo acquires its whey from Chokos
without cost does not impact the analysis of Moon Moo’s intent in
applying the whey to its fields. Moon Moo’s primary purpose in
returning the mixture to the soil is to improve the soil condition.
(R. 6). Use of soil amendments supports Moon Moo’s increase in
operations to accommodate Chokos’ heightened demand. (R. 5).
As far as whey, “land application of whey as a soil conditioner
was a longstanding practice that has been traditional in New
Union since the 1940s.” (R. 6). Moon Moo’s use comports with
farming practices in place long before RCRA. Even though
Chokos provides the whey at no cost, that does not mean Moon
Moo intends to discard it. (R. 5). In fact, it is inconceivable that
Moon Moo would accept Chokos’s whey for mere disposal if it did
not serve a beneficial purpose to Moon Moo. The operator in
Meyer also did not receive payment for the grass residue, but that
did not transform beneficial use into waste disposal. See generally
Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035. Although Chokos does not receive money
for its whey, it benefits from Moon Moo’s increased capacity.
In addition to RCRA’s plain language and Congress’s intent,
Meyer looked at the operator’s intent. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1045.
There, blue grass residue was an “integral component in the open
burning process” that provided many benefits. Id. at 1043.
Similarly, Moon Moo applies whey and manure as part of its
Nutrient Management Plan (NMP). (R. 5–6). Existence of an
NMP reinforces the validity of an operator’s beneficial use. In
Oklahoma, the operator complied with an Animal Waste
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Management Plan (AWMP) when applying poultry litter as a soil
amendment. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14941, at *21-22 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 17, 2010). Existing
regulations showed that Oklahoma endorsed the beneficial use.
Oklahoma, at *42.
Moon Moo Farm submitted its NMP to the New Union
Department of Agriculture (DOA), which has authority to reject
NMPs (R. 5). The NMP details the rate at which Moon Moo may
apply the amendments to its fields and outlines the projected
nutrient uptake of the crops. Id. Even if some aspect of the
material is not fully used, that does not transform it into
discarded material. Oklahoma, at *43. Animal waste can become
discarded when applied in excessive quantities; however,
Riverwatcher has not shown that Moon Moo excessively applied
soil amendments. See Water Keeper Alliance, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21314. To the contrary, Moon Moo applies the whey and
cow manure to its fields in compliance with its NMP. (R. 6).9
Farmers commonly use animal manure as a soil amendment
or share it with others for that purpose. Oklahoma, at *20.
Congress acknowledged this practice and explicitly excluded
“agricultural wastes, including manures . . . returned to the soil
as fertilizers or soil conditioners” from RCRA. 40 C.F.R. §
257.1(c)(1); see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 3. Oklahoma argued
that poultry waste applied to fields qualified as “other discarded
material” from agricultural operations, despite its many
beneficial uses. Oklahoma, at *40-1. Poultry litter constituted “an
agricultural commodity for which there [was] both a market and
a market value” as opposed to unwanted waste. Id. at *33.
In another manure case, the plaintiffs alleged that manure
“applied to agricultural fields at above-argonomic levels and
leaked from lagoons storing manure” qualified as discarded.
Cmty. Ass’n for the Restoration of the Env’t v. George & Margaret
LLC, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (E.D. Wash. 2013). This resulted
in high levels of nitrates in drinking water. Id. at 1154. The court
looked to Meyer and cited the ordinary meaning of discarded, “to

9. Riverwatcher contends that Moon Moo’s NMP is not subject to public
comment, however, any dispute with the NMP should be pursued through
administrative process at the DOA and not in this proceeding. Further, RCRA
does not speak to any specific criteria for valid NMPs.
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cast aside; reject; abandon; give up.” Id. at 1156 (internal citation
omitted). Another key factor was “whether that product ‘has
served its intended purpose and is no longer wanted by the
consumer.’” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
713 F.3d 502, 515 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491,
at 2).
Even if Moon Moo’s soil amendments qualify as solid waste,
Moon Moo has not violated RCRA’s open dumping provisions
because those “criteria do not apply to agricultural wastes,
including manures and crop residues, returned to the soil as
fertilizers or soil conditioners.” 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1). Moon Moo
has not applied its soil amendments in excessive quantities, and
has complied with a valid NMP at all times. (R. 6). Moon Moo’s
good faith compliance evidences its intent to improve its farm.
B. Moon Moo Farm’s untested contribution to
elevated nitrate levels does not rise to the level of
an “imminent and substantial” threat to human
health.
Riverwatcher next asserts that Moon Moo disposed of solid
waste so as to create an “imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment.” (R. 11)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2012)). The endangerment
alleged relies on Farmville Water Authority (FWA)’s decision to
issue a drinking water advisory due to “highly elevated levels of
nitrates and fecal coliforms.” (R. 6). FWA warned residents that
nitrate levels “made the Farmville municipal water supply unsafe
for drinking by infants” and recommended that infants receive
bottled water. Id. Even though RCRA embodies a forgiving
standard, Riverwatcher failed either to link Moon Moo’s conduct
to the advisory or to establish a sufficient threat of actual harm to
community residents.
1.

Riverwatcher has not established a sufficient
causal link between Moon Moo’s activities and
the nitrate advisories.

The district court properly granted summary judgment in
Moon Moo’s favor because Riverwatcher failed to establish a
causal link between Moon Moo and the nitrate advisories. In fact,
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“Riverwatcher’s own expert conceded that Moon Moo Farm’s
practices are not the ‘but-for’ cause of the nitrate advisories.” (R.
11). The Farmville Water Authority issued similar advisories “in
2002, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010, before the increase in Moon
Moo Farm’s operations.” (R. 7). These advisories also predate
Moon Moo’s acceptance of whey from Chokos. (R. 5). Moon Moo’s
conduct has not altered the length of time between advisories,
which ranges from one to four years. (R. 7). Moon Moo’s increased
capacity appears to have no impact at all on the issuance of
nitrate advisories in Farmville or their frequency. Furthermore,
“the Deep Quod watershed is heavily farmed.” Id. No other
parties potentially responsible for nitrate pollution have been
joined to this suit. Without these parties, it is unlikely that any
judgment against Moon Moo would substantially impact nitrate
levels in the watershed.
In Steilacoom Lake Improvement Club, Inc. v. Washington,
the Ninth Circuit held that elevated phosphorous levels in a lake
that lead to water quality violations did not pose an imminent
danger to resident health or the environment. 138 Fed. Appx.
929, 932 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly to Riverwatcher, the
Steilacoom plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between the
defendant’s conduct and phosphorous level in the lake. Id. at 932.
Plaintiffs would need to establish “how much excess phosphorous
is contributed by any of the many other watershed property
owners” to establish causation. Id. Riverwatcher has not even
identified other possible contributors to nitrate levels in the
watershed.
2.

Nitrate advisories create no imminent risk of
harm in Farmville.

Although RCRA’s standard extends to conduct that “may”
present a risk to human health or the environment, the potential
harm must be imminent. This does not require a showing of
actual harm, but requires “a threat which is present now.” Price
v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994)
(emphasis original). Under RCRA’s imminence requirement the
mere fact of contamination does not establish causation. In
Scotchtown Holdings, LLC v. Goshen, a New York district court
noted that “courts often dismiss RCRA claims where,
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notwithstanding the existence of hazardous substances in a water
supply, the specific factual circumstances at issue prevent
humans from actually drinking contaminated water.” 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1656, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2009). The FWA’s
advisement to use bottled water for infants sufficiently protects
human health and neutralizes the risk of actual harm.
The Fourth Circuit similarly denied a RCRA claim based on
hazardous substances found in groundwater and wells near a
manufacturing facility. Leister v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc.,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16961, at *8 (4th Cir. Jul. 8, 1997).
Although the contaminants unmistakably posed a serious threat,
Black & Decker previously entered into a consent order to install
a filtration mechanism. Id. at *4. As a result, the court found no
risk of imminent exposure, and concluded that relief under RCRA
was not warranted. Id. at *8. Even alternatives far less
sophisticated than installing a filtration mechanism can
adequately curtail the risk.
In Davies v. Nat’l Coop. Refinery Ass’n, the alleged
endangerment consisted of hydrocarbon pollution in well water
that supplied a local radio station. 963 F. Supp. 990, 992 (D. Kan.
1997). Experts calculated “the carcinogenic health risk to
individuals exposed to water from the old and new wells,
respectively, to be 650 and 219 times greater than acceptable.” Id.
at 996. Evidence did not “establish or address the likelihood that
any person will actually be exposed to” the contaminated water.
Id. at 999. The court opined, “plaintiffs have been warned of the
danger and are able to occupy the property without serious risk to
their health by using an alternative water supply.” Id. RCRA’s
purpose of avoiding harm to human health does not transform it
into a broad remedial statute. Since Farmville residents can
avoid any possible health hazard by using bottled water for
infants, no imminent risk of harm exists. The FWA has issued
nitrate advisories multiple times in the past. The record does not
indicate any instance where the FWA failed to alert residents to
possible risks posed by elevated nitrate levels.
The risk to Farmville residents is also far less serious than
other instances where courts have denied relief under RCRA.
Courts generally conclude that an endangerment is substantial
when it is “serious.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.,
399 F.3d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Price, 39 F.3d 1011. In
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Interfaith, a concrete risk of actual exposure informed the court’s
conclusion that the risk was serious. Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.
Amounts of hexavalent chromium indisputably attributable to
Honeywell “exceeded all applicable . . . contamination standards
for soil, groundwater, surface water, and river sediments adjacent
to the Site.” Id. Containment measures exhibited damage and
leaks, and Interfaith also produced “evidence of human trespass .
. . including holes and damage to the Site’s fence and . . .
discarded food and wrappers, toys, fishing poles and equipment,
and graffiti.” Id. at 262. Both the seriousness of the harm and
potential for actual exposure differ significantly from the FWA’s
nitrate advisories. The nitrate advisory impacts a small, readily
identifiable subset of Farmville’s population—infants less than
two years of age. This allows the FWA to warn affected
individuals before any actual exposure takes place. Unlike
attempting to close off an area to trespassers, provision of bottled
water is an alternative guaranteed to prevent exposure.
Since Riverwatcher failed to establish a causal link between
Moon Moo’s application of soil amendments and the nitrate
advisory, and failed to establish that the threat is both imminent
and substantial, the district court properly granted summary
judgment in Moon Moo’s favor. Even if the danger were imminent
and substantial, Riverwatcher has not shown that injunctive
relief against Moon Moo would have any impact on nitrate levels
in the Deep Quod watershed.
III. THE QUEECHUNK CANAL IS NOT A PUBLIC
TRUST NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE STATE OF
NEW UNION BECAUSE IT IS NOT A WATER IN
ITS NATURAL STATE AND HAS NO PUBLIC
RIGHT OF ACCESS.
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
gives the federal government power “to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Early on, the Supreme
Court held that the government’s power to regulate commerce
included regulation of activities related to navigation. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824). After Gibbons, the question became
the scope of navigability. The navigability test in The Daniel Ball,
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decided by the Supreme Court in 1870, remains the standard
used by the federal government to determine navigability for
Commerce Clause purposes. There, the court held that “rivers are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water.” The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
557, 563 (1870). The court subsequently expanded the scope of
navigability to include waters that have been improved to allow
for navigability. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940).
However, an important distinction exists between a river’s
navigability for Commerce Clause purposes and its navigability
for title purposes because the Commerce Clause “speaks in terms
of power, not of property.” United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956). This means that a water body’s
navigability simply gives the federal government regulatory
power over the water. Title of the beds and banks of navigable
waters, however, rests in the states as sovereigns. Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31 (1894).10 In order for a water body to be
navigable for state title purposes, the water body must have been
navigable at the time of statehood, based on the “natural and
ordinary condition of the water.” PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at
1228. Upon admission to the Union, title passes to the state, “as
incident to the transfer to the state of local sovereignty, and is
subject only to the paramount power of the United States to
control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and
foreign commerce.” United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1,
14 (1935).

10. This rule originates from English common law. PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1226 (2012). After the American Revolution, the
newly formed United States adopted the same rule: “the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to
all their navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use,
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general
government.” Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). The same
principle was true for each state thereafter admitted to the Union because the
states are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution. Lessee of Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 231 (1845). This principle came to be known as the equal
footing doctrine. Id. at 216.
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The Queechunk Canal was constructed in the 1940s by the
previous owner of Moon Moo’s property. (R. 5). New Union
became a state before that time. (R. 4). Since New Union became
a state before the Queechunk Canal existed, the bed and banks of
the current canal cannot be owned by the State of New Union. In
these instances, as the Supreme Court stated, “if they were not
then navigable, the title to the river beds remained in the United
States.” United States v. State of Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
A. The Queechunk Canal is not a navigable water
body because it is not in its natural state and is not
used for commercial purposes.
The long held test for navigability of waterways is that
“rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
The Queechunk Canal, as a man-made canal, cannot be
considered navigable under the Daniel Ball test because it is not
a water body in its ordinary condition. The farm’s previous owner
created the entire canal where there was none before. In addition,
there is no evidence that the canal has ever been used
commercially. It was constructed to alleviate flooding at the
nearby bend in the Deep Quod River. (R. at 5). The canal’s creator
used private resources to protect his property against flood
damage. The canal’s creator never intended that it be used for
commerce and, in fact, prominently posted signs declaring no
trespassing. Id.
Because the canal is not a navigable waterway, the public
trust doctrine does not apply. Therefore, no public right of
navigation exists on the Queechunk Canal, and James committed
trespass when he entered the canal.
B. Even if the Queechunk Canal were navigable, there
is no public right of access because the canal was
privately constructed.
The private construction of the Queechunk Canal exempts it
from being subject to a public right of access. Furthermore, while
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the federal government has authority over navigable waters for
commerce purposes, that authority does not entitle it to control
the water for title purposes. This establishes only the right to
control use of navigable waters in the United States. As the
Supreme Court held in Twin City Power Co.:
‘[t]he interest of the United States in the flow of a navigable
stream originates in the Commerce Clause. That Clause
speaks in terms of power, not of property. But the power is a
dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any
competing or conflicting one. The power is a privilege which
we have called ‘a dominant servitude’ or ‘a superior
navigation easement.’

United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25
(1956). In Kaiser Aetna, owners of an artificially constructed
marina, Kuapa Pond, sought to deny public access. When owners
made the necessary improvements to create a fully functioning
marina, it was declared to be navigable by the Army Corps of
Engineers. The Ninth Circuit held that the federal navigation
servitude obligated the marina to allow public access since the
marina became navigable. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 166 (1979). The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and held that while “it is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within
definitions of ‘navigability’ articulated in past decisions of this
Court . . . it must be recognized that the concept of navigability in
these decisions was used for purposes other than to delimit the
boundaries of the navigational servitude.” Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S.
at 171. The Court found that the concept of navigability had been
used only to:
define the scope of Congress’s regulatory authority under the
Interstate Commerce Clause, to determine the extent of the
authority of the Corps of Engineers . . . and to establish the
limits of the jurisdiction of federal courts conferred by Art. III,
§ 2, of the United States Constitution over admiralty and
maritime cases.

Id. The Court went on to say that creating a public right of access
after private owners improved Kuapa Pond would constitute a
taking contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
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Like in Kaiser Aetna, Moon Moo owns a privately constructed
water body that, but for private investment, would not be
navigable. “If a waterway is a ‘navigable water of the United
States,’ the federal government has the power to subject it to
exclusive federal regulation, at least with respect to navigation
issues.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Is a Navigable Water? Canoes
Count but Kayaks Do Not, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067, 1070
(2003). The federal government certainly has power to regulate
aspects of the canal, including Coast Guard jurisdiction over
navigation safety, Army Corps of Engineers authority to regulate
structural and obstruction issues, and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission authority to regulate dams. Id.
Even if the Queechunk Canal can be considered federally
navigable, the government cannot compel it to open the canal to
public navigation without affecting a taking. A private party
developed the canal for the sole purpose of alleviating flooding at
the bend of the Deep Quod River, where a large portion of Moon
Moo Farm is located. (R. 5). This flood reduction mechanism
served to help protect the farm’s property from damage. The Fifth
Amendment to the United Sates Constitution provides, “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment
prohibits granting public access to the Queechunk Canal without
just compensation. In this case, there is no evidence that Moon
Moo’s owners received just compensation for a public right of
access on the canal. To allow a public right of access contravene
Kaiser Aetna, intended to protect private property owners against
unconstitutional government takings.
In conclusion, Moon Moo argues that the Queechunk Canal is
not subject to public trust navigation because it is not a navigable
waterway. Even if the court can find navigability, while the
federal government clearly has some regulatory power over the
Queechunk Canal, it does not have the right to declare the canal
navigable for public access purposes. Without just compensation,
opening the Queechunk Canal to public access is an
unconstitutional taking contrary to the Fifth Amendment.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/5

32

2015]

BEST BRIEF: OVERALL

153

IV. BECAUSE THE QUEECHUNK CANAL DOES NOT
HAVE A PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS, AND
BECAUSE OF A BREAK IN THE EVIDENTIARY
CHAIN OF CUSTODY, EVIDENCE OBTAINED
THROUGH TRESPASS AND WITHOUT A
WARRANT IS INADMISSIBLE.
Moon Moo rejects the authenticity of evidence presented by
James and EPA. As the Ninth Circuit held in Black, a court
reviews a lower court’s decision to admit certain evidence for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1342
(9th Cir. 1985). The same circuit previously held that the
proponent bears the burden of establishing chain of custody, to
the satisfaction of the trial judge. Gallego v. United States, 276
F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). Riverwatcher has not established
“sufficient proof so that a reasonable juror could find that the
[evidence is] in ‘substantially the same condition’ as when” first
obtained. United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th
Cir. 1991). Courts consider the nature of the article,
circumstances surrounding its preservation and custody, and the
likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it. Gallego, 276 F.2d
at 917. Moon Moo points specifically to the circumstances
surrounding preservation and custody as well as the likelihood of
tampering.
A.

Evidence is inadmissible because of a break in the
chain of custody.

Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states, “[t]o satisfy
the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it
is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). This rule applies equally in civil cases.
Fed. R. Evid. 101. The above rule, better known as the “chain of
custody” rule “is but a variation of the principle that real evidence
must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.”
United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982).
“The purpose of this threshold requirement is to establish that
the item to be introduced is what it purports to be.” Id. The
Second Circuit held that the object must be shown to be in
substantially the same condition as when the crime was
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committed before it can be admitted as evidence. United States v.
S.B. Penick & Co., 136 F.2d 413, 415 (2d Cir. 1943). “This can be
accomplished by showing a ‘chain of custody,’ which indirectly
establishes the identity and integrity of the evidence by tracing
its continuous whereabouts. Or such evidence may be visually
identified by witnesses.” United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514
(10th Cir. 1980). The Howard-Arias court developed the idea
further, holding that a missing link in the chain of evidence does
not necessarily preclude the evidence as long as there is sufficient
proof that the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been
altered. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d at 366. Resolution of this
question rests with the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id.
The record shows that James collected samples and
submitted them to a lab. (R. at 6). However, there is no
verification that the samples from the river are substantially the
same as the samples Riverwatcher sought to admit. While a
break in the chain of custody does not necessarily bar admission
of evidence, there must be sufficient proof that the evidence is
what it purports to be. Howard-Arias, 679 F. 2d. at 366. Since the
proponent bears the burden of proof, James must verify that the
evidence has not been tampered with in any way. This proof does
not exist and the trial court, after James failed to produce this
evidence, properly excluded the evidence.
Moon Moo also
contends that James had a motive to tamper with the evidence.
The fact that evidence may be identified by witnesses is not a
valid defense here for two reasons. First, one witness could
undoubtedly be a staff member from the laboratory that analyzed
the samples; however, the court cannot be sure that the samples
tested in the lab were taken directly from the canal without
tampering. Second, one of the witnesses, James, is the same
person who collected the evidence and has a clear motive to be
untruthful. James’s affiliation with an environmental group, and
the fact that he is party to this litigation, is a reasonable motive
for tampering with any alleged samples collected from the
Queechunk Canal. As the Deep Quod Riverwatcher, it is
reasonably assumed that his goal to ensure that the river’s water
remains clean. This directive serves enough of a motive to stop a
perceived threat to the river by hindering the operations of
nearby agriculture.
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In summary, the water samples collected by James are not
admissible because the chain of causation was broken with no
verification that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.

CONCLUSION

Moon Moo Farm does not require a NPDES permit because it
is a CAFO. Even if it were, its discharges qualify as exempt
agricultural stormwater discharges. Moon Moo’s application of
soil amendments does not violate RCRA because the amendments
are not solid waste. Moon Moo’s conduct also has not created an
imminent and substantial endangerment to human health. The
district court properly awarded damages for and excluded
evidence procured by trespass on Moon Moo’s private property.
Therefore this Court should AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Moon Moo Farm and denial of summary
judgment to both Riverwatcher and EPA.
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